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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
LABOR LAW-BOYCOTIS AND STRIKES-Replaced
Economic Strikers Who Apply for Reinstatement
Remain Employees and Are Entitled to
Reinstatement When Positions Become Available
-Laidlaw Corporation and Local 681,
International Brotherhood of Pulp,
Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers,
AFL-CIO*
The collective bargaining agreement between the Laidlaw Corporation and Local 681 of the International Brotherhood of Pulp,
Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers, the certified bargaining agent
for Laidlaw's employees, contained a provision for modification of
wages during the term of the contract. In October 1965, the union
notified the company that, pursuant to this provision, it desired to
negotiate a wage increase. On January 10, 1966, after two unproductive bargaining sessions, the union voted to reject Laidlaw's only
offer,1 and two days later approximately seventy employees went on
strike.2 When no settlement was reached by February 11, forty of
the strikers came to Laidlaw's plant and presented written applications to the company offering to return to work immediately and
unconditionally. However, by then all but five of the workers' jobs
had been taken by replacements, and with respect to the replaced
workers, the request was denied. Subsequently the five workers who
had not been replaced were offered jobs. Between February 11 and
21, sixteen employees who had not been present at the February 11
meeting made ·written applications for reinstatement, but Laidlaw
rehired only those for whom vacancies existed at the time their ap• 171 N.L.R.B. No. 175, CCH 1968 NLRB Dec. 1J 22/)77 Gune 13, 1968) [hereinafter principal caseJ.
I. The union charged the employer with a violation of § 8(a)(5) of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964) for refusing to bargain in
good faith, but the Board rejected the local's contention since this practice had been
followed in all past negotiations benveen the parties without objection from the
union.
2. On the day before the strike began, the plant manager read a statement to the
employees emphasizing that if they went on strike and were replaced, they would
lose forever their right to employment with the company. This, however, was not a
completely accurate statement of the employees' rights; see note 5 infra and accompanying text. The company's refusal to consider the strikers for reemployment at any
time would have constituted a violation of § 8(a)(3) which, in part, prevents employer
discrimination in hiring practices which would discourage union membership. See note
4 infra and text accompanying note IO infra. Although it might be argued that the
employer's threat to do an illegal act might constitute an unfair labor practice and
thus make the strike an unfair labor practice strike from the beginning, the Board
stated that, because the employees did not strike for that reason, the strike remained
an economic one as of February II. Principal case at 29,824.
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plications were filed. The company made no attempt to fill subsequent job openings with the strikers who had been refused employment when no jobs were available on the day they applied. Instead,
it filled these later vacancies by advertising for and hiring new
employees. As a result of the company's actions, the union renewed
its strike on February 20.3 It also brought suit before the National
Labor Relations Board, alleging that the company's hiring policy
constituted an unfair labor practice under sections 8(a)(I) and
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act4 by intefering with the
employees' rights, guaranteed by the Act, 5 of organization, collective
bargaining, and striking, and by discriminating with regard to hire
or tenure of employment in order to discourage membership in the
union.
The trial examiner found for the union, and on appeal to
the NLRB the trial examiner's conclusion was affirmed. The Board
held that economic strikers who apply for reinstatement when their
positions have been filled by permanent replacements remain employees for purposes of the Act6 and that consequently their right to
reinstatement does not depend on the availability of jobs at the
moment they applied. These employees are entitled to an offer of
full reinstatement as soon as jobs become available, unless they have
in the interim acquired regular and substantially equivalent employment elsewhere, or unless the employer demonstrates legitimate
and substantial business reasons for refusing to offer reinstatement.7
3. By February 22 a total of ten strikers had been reinstated: eight others had been
offered reinstatement, but had declined the offer and remained on strike. The company did not check over the earlier reinstatement applications of February 11 before
hiring new employees. Principal case at 29,825.
4. 29 U .S.C. §§ 158(a)(l) and 158(a)(3) (1964). Section S(a) reads in part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
(I) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7: [See note 5 infra].
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any la•
bor organization . . • .
5. Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964), reads in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment ••••
6. Section 2(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964), defines "employment" as
follows: "The term employee ••• shall include any individual whose work has ceased
as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of
any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equal employment ••••"
7. The definition of an "employee" under § 2(3) of the NLRA refers to one
who loses his job because of a "current" labor dispute. The question arises whether
Laidlaw gives a right to reinstatement as long as the striker lives (assuming he takes
no other job) or only as long as the dispute can be called "current." The Board did

June 1969]

Recent Developments

1631

In the principal case, the court found that the employees in question
had not acquired other employment and that the employer could
not meet his burden of business justification. Consequently,
although the initial replacement of the striking employees was
proper, 8 Laidlaw's subsequent refusal to reinstate them when vacan•
cies occurred was held to be an unfair labor practice.9
The Laidlaw case raises the question of the degree to which the
NLRA protects a striking employee's right of reinstatement. The
relevant statutory provision is section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA which
provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization ...." 10 Thus, if an employer's refusal to
reinstate striking employees who have unconditionally applied dis•
courages union membership within the meaning of this section, the
refusal constitutes a violation of the Act. The Supreme Court has
held that generally t1vo separate elements must be proved in order
to establish an 8(a)(3) violation: (1) an act by the employer that tends
to discourage or encourage union membership, and (2) an antiunion
intent on the part of the employer.11 Thus, it is possible that a dis•
criminatory act would not be illegal because the second elementintent-is not proved.
Certain employer conduct, however, is so inherently destructive
of employee rights that it is presumed to violate the Act without
evidence of a specific antiunion intent.12 In such cases, the burden
not indicate how long this right would last, but it did indicate that the employer's
duty to "seek out" the former employees lasts as long as those employees signified an
intention to return by means of their applications and their "continuing presence."
Principal case at 29,827. However, it seems clear that if, after the termination of a
strike, an employer offers reinstatement to an employee, and that offer is rejected, the
employer's duty has been discharged, Thus, the obligation to "seek out" ends as
soon as the employee accepts equivalent employment elsewhere or rejects an offer of
re-employment. It would be highly unusual if neither of these events occurred within
a relatively short period of time after the original replacement, and consequently the
employer's burden would not be a heavy one.
8. Principal case at 29,827.
9. Principal case at 29,828.
IO. See note 4 supra.
11, "[T]he finding of a violation normally turns on whether the discriminatory
conduct was motivated by an anti-union purpose." NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers Co.,
388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967). In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227 (1963) the
Court noted that proof of an antiunion motivation may make unlawful certain employer conduct which would in other circumstances be lawful.
12. The Supreme Court has held in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers Co., 388 U.S.
26, !Ill (1967) that some employer conduct is so destructive of employee interests that
it violates the Act without proof of an antiunion motive. The Court's rationale was
that there is some conduct the consequences of which are so clear that the employer
must have intended them. In American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311
(1965) the Court stated that there are employer practices "which are inherently so
prejudicial to union interests and devoid of significant economic justification that no
special evidence of intent to discourage union membership or other antiunion ani-
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is on the employer to show legitimate and substantial reasons for
his actions; if he fails to sustain that burden he is deemed guilty of
an unfair labor practice.13 It has been held that conduct which can
trigger this shift in the burden of proof includes the hiring of new
employees in the face of outstanding applications for reinstatement
from striking employees. 14 Consequently, in a situation like that of
the principal case, the fact that replacement of striking employees
and refusal to reinstate them clearly discourage union membership15
is sufficient to establish a violation of the Act, irrespective of intent,
unless the employer can justify his actions by legitimate business
reasons. Such justification might arise from the employer's right to
protect his business during a strike. Since an employer may not
ordinarily fire an employee because he is striking,16 the employer's
only means of continuing business is to replace the striking
workers for the duration of the strike.17 In many cases, the only
mus is required." See, e.g., Erie Resistor in which the Supreme Court held that when
an employer offers a grant of twenty years "super-seniority" both to replacements and
to striking employees as an inducement for those striking employees to return to
work, such employer will be guilty of an 8(a)(3) violation without a showing of intent. The Court's rationale was that some acts are so inherently discriminatory that
the requisite intent to make out the violation may be inferred from the act itself.
See also NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965) in which the Court stated, "[W]hen an
employer practice is inherently destructive of employee rights and is not justified by
the service of important business ends, no specific evidence of intent to discourage
union membership is necessary to establish a violation of § 8(a)(3)."
13. In NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967), the Supreme Court
stated that when the employer's conduct "could have adversely affected employee
rights to some extent," the employer had the burden of showing that he was motivated by legitimate objectives. 389 U.S. at 380. See also NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers
Co., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967). But see Great Dane at 34, where the Court stated that
when "resulting harm to employee rights is ••• comparatively slight, and a substantial
and legitimate business end is served, the employer's conduct is prima facie lawful
and an affirmative showing of improper motivation must be made."
14. The Court, in Fleetwood, stated at 378:
If, after the conclusion of the strike, the employer refuses to reinstate striking
employees, the effect is to discourage employees from exercising their rights to
organize and to strike •..• Under §§ 8(a)(l) and (3) it is an unfair labor practice
to interfere with the exercise of these rights. Accordingly unless the employer
who refuses to reinstate strikers can show that his action had legitimate and substantial business justification, he is guilty of an unfair labor practice. The bur•
den of justification is on the employer.
If the mere refusal to fire replacements of economic strikers were held to be violative
of § 8(a)(3), the balance of power would be shifted completely to the union. Hence,
the employer may justify his actions by showing legitimate business reasons for
them.
15. See principal case at 29,827. Refusing to rehire strikers when vacancies occur
would discourage employees from striking and would weaken a union's ability to
enlarge membership since its only effective economic weapon-the strike-would be
greatly limited by the increased danger to the employees when they do strike.
16. Firing a striking employee would be a violation of § 8(a)(l) which protects
employees from infringement of the right to strike guaranteed by § 7. See NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 223 (1963) and note 3 supra.
17. In this way a balance is struck between the competing, legitimate interests
of the parties.
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way by which he can attract replacements is by promising them
permanent employment.18 This fact might appear to provide the
needed business justification for refusing immediate reinstatement
of strikers at the expense of their replacements, thereby defeating an allegation of a section 8(a)(3) violation. In reality, however, the
courts have long drawn a distinction between economic strikers,
who strike for better wages or working conditions as in Laidlaw,
and unfair labor practice strikers, who strike to protest illegal employer conduct. 10 In the case of an unfair labor practice strike, the
employer has no legitimate economic justification for his initial
replacement of the striking employees since the strike arises from
his illegal act. The employer in such a situation is, from the beginning, in violation of section 8(a)(3), and when the strike ends the
strikers are entitled to immediate reinstatement even if that means
that their replacements must be fired. 20 In the case of an economic
strike, on the other hand, the employer has committed no illegal act
and has a legitimate business interest in replacing the strikers.
Therefore, although the act of replacement ipso facto discourages
union membership, 21 the act is justified and the employer has a right
to retain the replacements who were hired to protect his interest.22
Nevertheless, an employee striking for economic reasons is not
totally unprotected by the Act; 23 because he remains an employee
18. See Note, Replacement of Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630, 635-36
(1966). However, in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), a similar contention was rejected. The employer claimed in Erie Resistor that it was necessary for
him to offer replacements not only the guarantee of permanent jobs, but also an immediate twenty years seniority in order to get enough workers to enable him to continue production. The Board rejected this claim and held that such an offer violated
§ 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.
19. NLRB v. Mackay Radio&: Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938). When employees
strike over what they believe to be an unfair labor practice, but the Board determines
there was, in fact, no unfair labor practice, the strike is an economic one and the
employees may be permanently replaced. NLRB v. United Brass Works, 287 F.2d 689,
695-96 (4th Cir. 1961).
20. Mastro Plastics v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956). "Under these circumstances
the striking employees [ULP strikers] do not lose their status and are entitled to reinstatement with back pay, even if replacements for them have been made." See also
Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
888 (1964). If an unfair labor practice striker desires to return prior to the end of the
strike, he may do so. NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 245 F.2d 594, 597 (5th Cir.
1957).
21. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
22. NLRB v. Mackay Radio &: Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 346 (1938).
23. If an employer commits an unfair labor practice during the course of an economic strike, the strike is immediately converted into an unfair labor practice strike,
and any replacements hired after that conversion has taken place must be dismissed,
if necessary, to find a place for a returning striker. Frick and UAW, 161 N.L.R.B. No.
99 (1966) and Beverage-Air Co. and International Union of Electrical Workers, 164
N.L.R.B. No. 156 (1967). In the principal case, the Board found that the strike was
converted into an unfair labor practice strike on February 11, and that therefore no
striker could have been justifiably replaced after that date. Principal case at 29,826.
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under the Act, 24 he is, after application, ordinarily entitled to his
former job when it again becomes available. The employer, to defeat that right, must show valid justification for not reinstating the
replaced employee when the vacancy occurs.
One such justification, which employers have frequently invoked,
is that the employee's right to reinstatement expires if no job is
available on the date of application. Until 1967, the test for when
the right to reinstatement expires was indeed a "date of application"
rule. 25 If no job opening existed on the date of application, the
striker was entitled to no more than nondiscriminatory consideration as an applicant for new employment.26 The employer was under
no obligation to seek out the employee when positions became
available.
The Supreme Court recently rejected the "date of application"
test in NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Company. 21 In that case the
employer had curtailed production during an economic strike.
Shortly after the strike began, six strikers applied for reinstatement,
but their applications were rejected on the grounds that their jobs
had been eliminated.28 However, about two months later, full production was restored and the employer hired six new employees for
jobs for which the striker-applicants were qualified. Although eventually all the strikers were rehired, the six applicants brought suit for
a back pay award alleging that the employer had violated section
8(a)(3) by hiring new employees prior to their own reinstatement.
The employer admitted that to deny the employees' right to reinstatement would be an unfair labor practice, but argued that their
right had expired on the date of their application since no jobs were
available on that date. 29 The Court rejected this contention, holding
that workers whose jobs had ceased as the result of a labor dispute
remained employees under section 2(3) of the Act until they had
found equivalent employment.30 Because they remained employees,
the Court said, their right to their former jobs, when these jobs
became available, was too important to turn on the mechanical
24. See note 6 supra.
25. NLRB v. Brown &: Root, 203 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1953) had established the "date
of application" test. See also Atlas Storage Div., 112 N.L.R.B. 114, enj'd sub. nom.
Teamsters, Local 200 v. NLRB, 233 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1956).
26. Presumably, the employer could not refuse to rehire a worker merely because
the worker had struck. However, a striking employee was not entitled to any favorable treatment just because he had been, and still remained an employee. Under such
a standard a replaced worker arguably had no priority over a stranger who had applied for a job prior to the replacement and was still waiting to be hired.
27. 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
28. Permanent elimination of a job is considered to be the same as the permanent
replacement of a worker. Teamsters, Local 200 v. NLRB, 233 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir.
1956). In both situations the need for the services of the former employee has ceased.
29. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 376-77, 380 (1967).
30. See note 6 supra.
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"date of application" test. 31 Therefore, the Court held that the replaced economic striker was entitled to an offer of reinstatement
whenever a job for which he was qualified became available.32
With the "date of application" test rejected, the employer in
Fleetwood was left to defend his actions on the grounds of a legitimate business interest.83 On this point, the Court found that the
employer's hiring of the new employees evidenced an intent to reactivate the jobs as soon as possible,34 and that there was therefore
no legitimate reason shown for failure to rehire the employees who
had struck.85 The employer's conduct thus constituted a violation of
the NLRA and back pay was awarded. Since Fleetwood, then, the
economic striker who has applied for reinstatement has a right to
it when a job for which he is qualified becomes available. This right
lasts until the employee takes equivalent employment elsewhere, and
only a legitimate business reason for not offering reinstatement can
defeat it.36
The Laidlaw decision is consistent with the Fleetwood rationale.
The facts of Laidlaw, however, present one significant difference
which makes that case an extension of the Supreme Court's decision.
Fleetwood involved a situation in which the initial replacement of
striking economic employees was improper. The strikers in Fleetwood applied for reinstatement before the- jobs, which had been
temporarily eliminated by the strike, again became available. Thus,
when those jobs were reinstated, the company's policy of hiring new
employees to fill them while there were still applications outstanding could not be justified by legitimate business reasons. 37 In
Laidlaw, however, the initial replacement of the striking employees
was justified on legitimate business grounds.38 The question was
whether or not the employees had a right of reinstatement to positions which had already been filled once and vacated again. Laidlaw
therefore extends the Fleetwood doctrine by granting protection to
lll. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
112. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 381 (1967):
The basic right to jobs cannot depend upon job availability as of the moment
the applications are filed. The right to reinstatement does not depend upon technicalities relating to application. On the contrary, the status of the striker as an
employee continues until he has obtained other regular and substantially equivalent employment. (29 U.S.C. § 152(3).) Frequently a strike affects the level of
production and the number of jobs. It is entirely normal for striking employees
to apply for reinstatement immediately after the end of the strike and before full
production is resumed. If and when a job for which the striker is qualified becomes available he is entitled to an offer of reinstatemenL The right can be defeated only if the employer can show legitimate and substantial business justifications.
3!1. See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text.
114. 389 U.S. at 380.
115. See notes Ill and 14 supra and accompanying text.
116. See note Ill supra and accompanying text.
117. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
l!B. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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an increased number of workers: both those whose jobs have not
yet been filled and those whose jobs have been properly filled and
subsequently vacated again.
The Fleetwood and Laidlaw decisions will not affect the reinstatement rights of all strikers. The rights of the unfair labor
practice striker, for example, will remain the same, since he has
always retained the right to immediate replacement at the termination of the strike.39 Neither will the rights of "wildcat" strikers40
be affected. "Wildcat" strikers, unlike economic or unfair labor
practice strikers, are engaging in unprotected activity and may be
legally discharged by the employer,41 thus terminating their status
as employees. Since the rationale of both Fleetwood and Laidlaw
rests on the proposition that the replaced strikers are entitled to
protection because they remain employees, 42 those decisions do not
protect a striker who does not maintain his status as an employee.
The same analysis can be made in the case of a striker who is fired
for breaking a no-strike clause. Since the employer may legally
discharge employees who violate such a clause in their contract,
thereby terminating the employment relationship, that employer
should have no affirmative duty to reinstate them. 43
Replaced economic strikers, however, will benefit from the
change in the law. This advantage may come in one of two situations. The first would occur when new jobs become available
because of an increase in production44 or the departure either of
the replacements themselves or of other employees.45 When this
39. See note 20 supra.
40. A wildcat strike is a strike by a minority of the workers in a bargaining unit
without authorization from the union.
41. NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944) held that since a wildcat
strike is an unprotected activity, it is proper for an employer to discharge the strikers
upon replacement. See also NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 318 F.2d 661 (7th Cir.
1963), where the court stated that if workers went on a wildcat strike, they were engaging in an unprotected activity and could be discharged. At 663 the court stated:
[T]he purpose of the [National Labor Relations] act was not to guarantee to em•
ployees the right to do as they please but to guarantee to them the right of collective bargaining for the purpose of preserving industrial peace • • • • [T]here
can be no effective bargaining if small groups of employees are at liberty to ignore
the bargaining agency thus set up, take particular matters into their own hands
and deal independently with the employer ••.. No surer way could be found to
bring collective bargaining into general disrepute than to hold that "wild-cat"
strikes are protected by the collective bargaining statute.
Citing, NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199, 203, 205 (4th Cir. 1944).
42. See notes 6, 20, 24, and 30 supra and accompanying text.
43. See UMW v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1958), in which the court held, at
214-15, that although a strike in violation of a no strike clause does not constitute
an unfair labor practice by the union, it is nevertheless an unprotected activity. The
court held that employees who strike in violation of such agreement may be discharged
with impunity. See also Confectionary, Tobacco Drivers &: Warehousemen's Union,
Local 805 v. NLRB, 312 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1963), in which the court held that a
strike in violation of a no strike clause was not a protected activity.
44. Cf. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
45. Cf. the principal case.
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occurs, the replaced strikers who have applied for reinstatement
and been denied it initially because their jobs are filled will now
have the right to be offered those jobs before the employer can hire
any new employees:16 This result is quite desirable. An employer
having no antiunion intent has no reason to object to filling vacant
positions ·with individuals who are experienced in his business.47
Moreover, an employee who was replaced while engaging in protected activity has a clear interest in reinstatement if a position
becomes available.
The second situation may arise if, subsequent to replacement,
production is curtailed and workers are laid off. When a cut-back
occurs, the replacements are the most likely to be laid off because
they probably have the least seniority. The question then arises:
When the jobs become available again due to an increase in production, who should get them? Since Laidlaw determined that the
replaced workers, as well as their replacements,48 remained employees, the problem is one of deciding which of the two types of
employees is entitled to the jobs. If return to work is based on
seniority, as it often is, any former strikers who have applied will
have preference for these jobs because they have greatest seniority.49
This result, however, may be attacked on the ground that it
destroys the balance of interests between the employer and the employee. Specifically, the employer could argue that his failure to
accord later replacement protection, after a replacement worker is
laid off, will discourage persons from becoming replacements during
strike periods. According to this argument, then, the employer
would be unable to protect his legitimate interest in keeping his
business running during an economic strike; 50 the result would be
to give the employee too strong a weapon, thus upsetting the balance
of power between the parties. 51
46. See text accompanying notes 6-9, 22·23 supra.
47. The employer who does have an antiunion intent should not be allowed to
object since he would be required to dismiss a replacement and rehire a striker if the
existence of that intent could be proved. See note 20 supra and accompanying texL
48. When a replacement is laid off, he clearly remains an employee because he has
not been discharged. A lay off is a suspension of work, not termination of employ·
ment. White v. Crane Co., 147 S.2d 32, 36 (La. App. 1962). See also Fishgold v. Sullivan Dry Dock &: Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 286-87 (1946), in which the Supreme
Court distinguished between lay off and discharge.
49. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), in which the employer
attempted to disturb this traditional seniority with a grant to replacements of twentyyears "super-seniority." The Supreme Court refused to let him do so. The protection
went to strikers who had not been replaced. With Laidlaw, this protection was extended to replaced strikers as well.
50. NLRB v. Mackay Radio &: Tel, Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
51. Should an employer decide to rehire the replacement instead of the original
striker, he might use this argument as a basis for showing the requisite business jus•
tification which would exempt him from a violation of § 8(a)(3) of the Act. But
see text accompanying note 52 infra.
Moreover, the replacement in this situation has a greater interest at stake. Not only
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Nevertheless, it is doubtful that this extension of Laidlaw, which
would allow a striking employee to regain his job over a replacement who had been laid off, will significantly disturb the balance of
interests between the employer and the employee. First, the situations in which the problem might arise are very limited. The only
industries likely to be affected by it are those which are either
cyclical or depressed, because they are the only ones in which the
chance of a lay-off is great enough to discourage workers from becoming replacements since they might not be rehired when production is resumed. In these industries, if there is no substantial likelihood that production will be quickly resumed, most of the replaced
strikers probably will not want to wait and will find new jobs
instead; thus, they will not compete with replacements for positions
with the original employer. But even if there is a chance for quick
resumption of production, the high rate of employee turnover in the
affected industries52 should allow the laid-off replacements to be reinstated soon after the former employees. Moreover, the problem presumably will arise only in the very limited context in which the
original employees have a weak union. When a strong union exists,
there is less chance of an employer attempting to continue production during a strike since all or most of the employees will be absent
from their jobs. It is only with a weaker union, in which a core of
workers may stay on the job, that continuation of production
through replacements is feasible. Thus, the problem created by the
priority of the former employees is one that is unlikely to occur.
Second, even if the problem should occur in a particular set of
circumstances, a worker would probably not be deterred from
becoming a replacement just because he knew he might lose his
job to a former employee in the event of a lay-off. Many of the industries affected are fluctuating or depressed, and the very nature of
those industries, as well as their high turnover rate, ought to indicate to a replacement that he should not expect permanent employment. Furthermore, in the case of depressed industries, the areas in
which these industries exist are characterized typically by unusually
high unemployment; 53 and it is likely that unemployed persons
in such areas would be willing to risk possible short-term employment as opposed to not working at all. They would, of course, hope
has he worked at the job, but he has been promised permanent employment. In fact
it was that promise that induced him to accept the job in the first place, thereby enabling the employer to protect his own interests. See note 18 supra and accompanying
text.

52. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, MANPOWER REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT ON
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS, REsOURCES, UTILIZATION, AND TRAINING 28 (1964) (construction industry). However, incidence of turnover in many depressed industries appears
to be declining. Cf. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, REVIEW 107-09 Gan. 1969) (table B-1).
53. U.S. DEPT, OF LABOR, MANPOWER REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT ON
POWER REQUIREMENTS, REsOURCES, UTILIZATION, AND TRAINING 139-43 (1968),
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to continue as permanent employees, but they would have nothing
to lose by accepting a possibly temporary job when there are no
other jobs available. Consequently, an employer in a depressed industry should be able to hire replacements and thereby be able to
protect his interests. In a cyclical industry that is not depressed,
such as the automobile industry, workers may not be willing to risk
short-term employment, and therefore an employer may have
trouble finding replacements. Nevertheless, the large turnover in
cyclical industries54 indicates that this situation would rarely be
crucial, for both the strikers and the replacements would probably
be reinstated soon after full production was resumed.
In light of this analysis, the Laidlaw decision appears to accomplish its goal of extending greater protection to the economic strikers
without sacrificing, to any great extent, the legitimate interests of
either the employer or the replacements.
54. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.

